A country needs more than a flag, internationally recognized borders, and sympathetic speeches from foreign leaders. It needs people who can afford to live there, raise children, build businesses, and pass something on to the next generation.

Weakening Russia may serve the interests of Ukraine’s partners. But weakening Russia and securing a viable future for Ukraine are not necessarily the same thing. At some point, we need to stop treating them as though they are.

Demographics

Ukraine’s demographic history did not begin in 1991, and Ukrainians did not exist only within Ukraine’s present borders.

The numbers need some care: counting ethnic Ukrainians is not the same as counting everyone living in Ukraine. Additionally, the sources and the differences in methodologies may impact the accuracy of these estimates, but you’ll at least get the big picture - the Ukrainian population was increasing throughout history quite steadily.

With that in mind, consider this:

• 1550–1650: Historical estimates put the Ukrainian population at approximately 4.9 million in 1550, rising to 5.3 million in 1650. These are reconstructions, not modern census counts.

• 1795: Approximately 8.2 million Ukrainians within the Russian Empire, excluding those living beyond its borders.

• 1834: Approximately 11 million Ukrainians.

• 1858: Approximately 13 million Ukrainians.

• 1897: Approximately 22.4 million Ukrainians.

• 1926: Approximately 31.2 million Ukrainians across the USSR, including those living outside the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

• 1932–1934: Reconstructed estimates put the population of Soviet Ukraine at 31.4 million at the beginning of 1932, falling to 27.8 million at the beginning of 1934. These figures count all residents within the republic’s borders at that time.

• 1959: Approximately 41.9 million residents in Ukraine, with another 5.1 million ethnic Ukrainians living elsewhere in the USSR.

• 1970: Approximately 47.1 million residents in Ukraine, with another 5.5 million ethnic Ukrainians elsewhere in the USSR.

• 1979: Approximately 49.8 million residents in Ukraine, with another 5.9 million ethnic Ukrainians elsewhere in the USSR.

• 1989: Approximately 51.7 million residents in Ukraine, with another 6.8 million ethnic Ukrainians elsewhere in the USSR, before even considering the diaspora beyond Soviet borders.

In 1991, Ukraine inherited a population of nearly 52 million people. Since that time it came down to between 42 and 44 million people prior to 2022, but went steadily downhill from there with present estimates ranging anywhere between 22 and 29 million people living on the territories controlled the Ukrainian government.

The figure below illustrates this demographic trend, but the problem is that the last official census was done in 2001, so everything after that are educated guesses. As stated above, modern estimates are actually much lower than what is shown here.

Source: https://joint-research-centre.ec.europa.eu/jrc-news-and-updates/war-exacerbates-ukraines-population-decline-new-report-shows-2023-03-08_en

Gloomy picture, isn’t it?

None of this means there were no natural or man-made population declines. But neither was this a history of uninterrupted demographic decline. It was not all dark and gloomy, however convenient that interpretation might be for today’s arguments.

War has added displacement on an enormous scale. By February 2026, UNHCR reported approximately 5.9 million refugees from Ukraine abroad, alongside approximately 3.7 million internally displaced people.

Those who left have not stopped being Ukrainian. But retaining an identity abroad and sustaining a country at home are different things.

Children settle into schools. Parents find work. Families learn another language and establish another life. At some point, returning to Ukraine may mean uprooting themselves all over again.

And what about their children? Or the children those children will eventually have?

The longer this continues, the more Ukraine risks losing not only its present population, but future generations who might otherwise have lived there. A nation can maintain a large diaspora and still struggle to maintain the country from which that diaspora came.

Economy

The financial picture is hardly more reassuring.

The Kyiv Independent looked into Ukraine’s growing debt and reported that public and publicly guaranteed debt had exceeded US$213 billion by the end of 2025. Much of the increase came from borrowing from official foreign creditors.1

Not every dollar carries the same repayment burden. Some loans have exceptionally favourable terms. The G7’s ERA loans are intended to be serviced from earnings on immobilized Russian assets, while repayment of the EU’s Ukraine Support Loan is tied to Russia paying reparations, the possibility of which is questionable at best.

Ukraine spent approximately US$6.8 billion on interest in 2024 alone, equivalent to roughly 4 percent of GDP. That is interest, not repayments of principal. The problem is that Ukraine must carry its interest bill while also financing a war and rebuilding what is being destroyed.

Source: https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2026/09/08/8052448/

A joint assessment by the Ukrainian government, World Bank, European Commission, and United Nations put direct damage through the end of 2025 at more than US$195 billion, with almost US$588 billion needed for recovery and reconstruction over the following decade. Those reconstruction needs are not existing government debt, but someone will still have to pay for them.

Replacing a destroyed power station or repairing a bridge does not necessarily make the country richer than it was before. It merely restores something the country already had.

Meanwhile, people who could help rebuild Ukraine are contributing to other economies.

A Deloitte study published with UNHCR estimated that Ukrainian refugees’ presence had a positive net effect equivalent to 2.7 percent of Poland’s GDP in 2024. The Polish Economic Institute also found that Ukrainians established approximately 77,700 sole proprietorships and 11,300 companies with Ukrainian capital in Poland during 2022–2024.

These are not all companies that physically relocated from Ukraine. Many are new businesses. But that is precisely the point: Ukrainians are building new economic lives elsewhere.

There is nothing wrong with families supporting themselves or entrepreneurs taking opportunities. The question is what Ukraine will have to offer to bring that activity home.

Then there is the sale of state assets.

In August 2026, the Kyiv Independent reported that Ukraine was seeking foreign investors for privatization auctions, while domestic buyers are far and few between.2

One example was the Odesa Portside Plant. Its planned auction starting price was approximately US$100 million, a mere one-fifth of its 2009 auction price. The State Property Fund’s leadership acknowledged that assets were being offered at discounted prices, while arguing that strategic investors would bring long-term commitments.

Perhaps they will. But selling under pressure is not the same as selling from a position of strength.

An investor who can afford to wait for peace may eventually acquire something very valuable. A government that needs money now has considerably less room to wait. Ukrainians are entitled to ask whether they will receive a fair share of the eventual recovery.

Agricultural land raises a similar concern.

The legal framework opening Ukraine’s land market reserved foreign access for a national referendum. Meanwhile, discussions have continued: a June 2026 event summarized by the Kyiv School of Economics (KSE) considered opening the market to EU citizens and companies, alongside concerns about ownership concentration and access for Ukrainian farmers.

However, a referendum cannot equalize purchasing power. Should access expand, a Ukrainian farmer trying to recover from years of war could find themselves competing with a foreign investor able to borrow more cheaply and wait much longer for a return. Promises of affordable loans for Ukrainians are only useful if Ukrainians can actually obtain them.

The same KSE discussion highlighted practical difficulties with agricultural financing, including administrative costs and limited uptake of credit guarantees. A programme existing on paper is not the same as a farmer having money in the bank.

And while all this is happening, financial support comes with conditions.

Reuters reported on March 18, 2026, that Ukraine had received US$1.5 billion under a new US$8.1 billion IMF programme, with further disbursements dependent on conditions. Proposed tax changes were expected to affect approximately 250,000 entrepreneurs, alongside measures involving digital platforms and VAT exemptions. Reuters also reported that IMF support was important for unlocking EU funding.3

Those were proposals, not a claim that every measure had already become law. But the relationship is clear enough: the country needs money, and its lenders want changes before providing more. In the end, ordinary Ukrainians will have to absorb the cost of borrowing.

How much practical freedom does a government have to say no when it needs the next payment to keep functioning? And how much more can its businesses carry before the people running them decide that starting over somewhere else is the better option?

What is ‘Victory’?

I’ve had countless discussions since 2022 about this, and the typical response is “restoring Ukraine to its 1991 borders.”

It might be hard to admit, but I am not convinced that repeating this objective makes it an achievable plan. Where is the explanation of how it happens, how long it takes, and what Ukraine will have left when it does?

So, what is this elusive “victory” that Ukraine is fighting towards?

In my humble opinion, preserving Ukrainian people, language, and culture should be the goal. It is ensuring there are more generations of Ukrainians to come—and that they have a country where they can realistically build their lives.

Land, economic unions, or military alliances do not constitute a nation. It is the people who live and breathe everything it is to be Ukrainian. Those other things matter because they are supposed to serve the people, not the other way around.

A nation is not built just on the basis of being “the opposite” of any one of its neighbours. That is not sustainable.

Unfortunately, this does not seem to be the definition of victory most are willing to accept. Yet.

The strategic interest of Ukraine’s partners is hardly a secret. In April 2022, then-US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, under President Biden, identified weakening Russia’s military capacity as an American objective, alongside preserving a sovereign Ukraine. He specifically spoke about preventing Russia from rapidly rebuilding the capabilities it was losing.4

That may be a sensible objective from Washington’s perspective. But Ukrainians are entitled to ask how much of their own future should be spent achieving it.

Is it a mutually beneficial deal? That depends on what Ukraine receives in the end—not merely on how much Russia loses.

Ukraine cannot build its strategy on the assumption that its supporters will eventually fight the war for it. Nor should expressions of gratitude prevent Ukrainians from questioning the costs of the course they are being encouraged to follow.

The United States is across the Atlantic - 9,158 kilometers (5,690 miles) away. The UK is about 2,477 kilometers (1,539 miles) away. France is about 2,190 kilometers (1,360 miles) away from Ukraine. Germany is about 1,519 kilometers (944 miles) away. Russia and Belarus are just next door.

In an ideal world, Ukraine is at peace with Russia and can maintain workable relations with both Russia and Belarus. Neutrality may be one option worth negotiating. Whether it would work depends on the terms and whether those terms can be upheld—not on whether the word itself is considered acceptable.

Negotiation does not have to mean friendship. Nor does accepting that some disputes may remain unresolved mean abandoning Ukraine’s identity.

At what point does another year of fighting cost Ukraine more than it is likely to gain?

Ukraine’s Relationship with Russia

I hate to break it to you, but for many Ukrainians, the cultural, linguistic, and family connections with Russia run much deeper than those with an Englishman, Frenchman, or German.

That is not an argument against Ukrainian independence. It is an argument against pretending that the relationship began in 2022.

It has been turbulent. There have been grievances, insults, and competing interpretations of history. But that does not mean the relationship between ordinary people was always hostile.

As recently as February 2014, a Kyiv International Institute of Sociology survey found that 68 percent of Ukrainians wanted Ukraine and Russia to remain independent but friendly countries, with open borders and no visas or customs barriers. Only 12 percent supported unification into one state. Wanting a constructive relationship with Russia was not the same as wanting Ukraine to disappear into it.

You do not get to choose your neighbours. You do get to decide whether permanent hostility is the only future you are prepared to imagine.

In the end, unfortunately, this is a war between two Slavic, Eastern Orthodox Christian nations.

The second President of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, laid out what I think is a useful foundation for this discussion in his 2003 book, Ukraine Is Not Russia. He tried to explain and strengthen Ukrainian identity without making hostility towards Russia its defining purpose.

Kuchma rejected the interpretation of Ukraine as simply a Russian colony. Instead, he described it as an integral part of metropolitan Russia, with the advantages and disadvantages that came with that position. This was his interpretation of a complicated relationship, not a claim that the relationship had been free of pressure or conflict.

Indeed, he also criticized Moscow’s suppression of Ukrainian national self-consciousness. But recognizing that pressure did not lead him to dismiss the entire shared past or the possibility of a different relationship in the future.

Ukrainians do not need to deny everything positive about their history with Russians to justify having a country of their own. Nor does acknowledging common ground mean accepting that Ukraine is not a separate nation.

The demographic history alone should make us hesitate before describing the imperial and Soviet periods as nothing but uninterrupted national decline. The picture was more complicated. It should be possible to say that without being accused of wanting to turn the clock back.

Kuchma’s starting point was a Ukraine that knew what it was, rather than one that needed Russia to remain its permanent opposite. I think that is a stronger foundation for national identity than defining every cultural or political choice through rejection.

None of this makes reconciliation easy. For people who have lost their homes or family members, it may feel impossible. But an eventual relationship between the two countries cannot depend on forgiveness. True statesmen must look beyond that.

At what point does the damage and burden of this war become too heavy for Ukraine to carry, given that its supporters are not eagerly lining up to fight in the trenches?

While it may be difficult to accept, Ukraine may eventually need to negotiate not only an end to the fighting, but a workable relationship with its largest neighbour. Its partners should also be expected to help create a financial settlement that leaves Ukraine able to recover.

The bills will not disappear the day an agreement is signed, because that can only happen if Russia wins. Neither will the need to persuade families to return, businesses to invest, and young people to have children.

In the grand scheme of things, it seems to me that the West has a clearer understanding of what it wants from this war. But is that vision aligned with the future of the Ukrainian nation?

Europe may gain from a weaker Russia. But a weaker Russia is not automatically a stronger Ukraine.

Ukraine is doing Europe a solid. The question is how much of Ukraine’s future it should have to spend doing it.

It has been a great era of NATO expansion, which would obviously be a trigger for a country sitting on the other side of the fence.

When in doubt, ask yourself this: if Russia said it was looking to establish a permanent military presence in Canada, Mexico, or Greenland, would the NATO countries nearby sit idly and say, “Well, sovereign countries can choose their own alliances”?

Think about that for a second. I wouldn’t bet on the ‘sit idly’ part.

People Prefer to Follow Rules They Like

The so called ‘rules based’ world order is gone and it is not coming back. In fact, it is worth discussing that it might never have been a ‘rules based’ world order. People tend to defend their side against the other side. As is inherent to human beings, the world picks sides. When something is beneficial to Side A, they support it. When it is beneficial to Side B, they oppose it. Remember the bombing of Belgrade and what happened in Yugoslavia? Libya? The WMD debacle in Iraq?

I won’t delve too deeply into this debate, although it is certainly an interesting one. What I am trying to say is that the world is not black or white. It has many shades of grey.

The reason we should discuss these things with our eyes wide open and be prepared to play devil’s advocate is simple: without a thorough understanding of the interests and positions of each side, it is impossible to reach any sort of positive—or at the very least neutral—resolution to a conflict, be it hot or cold.

I digress.

Are We About to Find Out?

This brings me to the topic at hand: why, militarily speaking, it can make sense for Russia to attack—and why that window of opportunity is quite narrow.

Let’s assume that we fucked around at about the 7 level. Are we about to find out? What would that look like? Short of level 10, which is nuclear warfare, of course. Or at least I hope.

Before we jump in, I want to show you an old map called “Europe as viewed from the U.S.S.R.” it is as relevant now as it was in the past. On this map, I highlighted the following countries, following their current borders as closely as possible, but expect a few errors, as I was doing this manually:

• Green: Ukraine, but only the territories currently under Ukrainian control.

• Yellow: Belarus

• Blue: Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland

• White: Poland

• Red: Russia

As you can see below, the Baltics are really between a rock and a hard place. Especially, if Belarus is involved.

The Principles of War

Before we discuss why I think it is highly likely that an attack might actually happen, we need to understand what typically drives strategic thinking in any war—hot or cold.

The ten Principles of War listed below have been adopted by the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee for the use and guidance of the Canadian Armed Forces. Feel free to do some research on this online; there are plenty of resources available.

Defining a principle as a guide to conduct, the following are the principles that must always influence commanders in war:

1. Selection and Maintenance of the Aim - In the conduct of war as a whole and in every operation of war it is essential to select and clearly define the aim. The ultimate aim is to break the enemy’s will to fight. All efforts must be directed to its attainment until a changed situation calls for a re-appreciation and consequently a new aim. This must be regarded as the “Master” Principle.

2. Maintenance of Morale - Success in war depends more on moral than on physical qualities. Numbers, armament and resources cannot compensate for lack of courage, energy, determination, skill and the bold offensive spirit which springs from a national determination to conquer. The development and subsequent maintenance of the qualities of morale are, therefore, essential to success in war.

3. Offensive Action - Offensive action is the necessary forerunner of victory; it may be delayed, but until the initiative is seized and the offensive taken victory is impossible.

4. Security - A sufficient degree of security is essential in order to obtain freedom of action to launch a bold offensive in pursuit of the selected aim. This entails adequate defence of vulnerable bases and other interests which are vital to the nation or the armed forces. Security does not imply undue caution and avoidance of all risks, for bold action is essential to success in war; on the contrary, with security provided for, unexpected developments are unlikely to interfere seriously with the pursuit of a vigorous offensive.

5. Surprise - The most effective and powerful influence in war, and its moral effect is very great. Every endeavour must be made to surprise the enemy and to guard against being surprised. By the use of surprise, results out of all proportion to the effort expended can be obtained, and in some operations, when other factors are unfavourable, surprise may be essential to success. Surprise can be achieved strategically, tactically or by exploiting new material. The elements of surprise are secrecy, concealment, deception, originality, audacity and rapidity.

6. Concentration of Force - To achieve success in war, it is essential to concentrate superior force, moral or material, to that of the enemy at the decisive time and place. Concentration does not necessarily imply a massing of forces, but rather having them so disposed as to be able to unite to deliver the decisive blow when and where required, or to counter the enemy’s threats.

7. Economy of Effort - This implies a balanced employment of forces, and a judicious expenditure of all resources with the object of achieving an effective concentration at the decisive time and place.

8. Flexibility - Modern war demands a high degree of flexibility to enable pre- arranged plans to be altered to meet changing situations and unexpected developments.

9. Co-operation - Based on team spirit and entails the co-ordination of all units so as to achieve the maximum combined effort from the whole.

10. Administration - The administrative arrangements must be designed to give the Commanders the maximum freedom of action in carrying out any plan.

With that out of the way, I hope you are still reading.

Fortunately, we won’t be able to cover all of these principles. Here are the ones I think are the most important for our analysis:

1. Offensive Action

2. Security

3. Surprise

4. Concentration of Force

5. Flexibility

The others are either self-explanatory or impossible for us to realistically evaluate in such a short amount of time.

What Does Russia Want?

While I won’t go in-depth into this Principle of War, it is the “Master” Principle, so we need to touch on it: Selection and Maintenance of Aim.

We can only guess what Russia’s aim is, but we can safely assume Russia has one. I’ll use Occam’s Razor here and say that, in this case, it might be counterproductive to come up with elaborate explanations. Therefore, let’s take Putin’s words for what they are:

They don’t want an opposing military alliance (i.e. NATO) on their border, especially when it involves countries with which they have historic ties. Some sort of buffer would certainly help defuse tensions between the two sides.

Keep that aim in mind throughout the rest of this article. I say again: they don’t want an opposing military alliance (i.e. NATO) on their border.

I was going to go over what has happened in Ukraine since 2013, but that will have to be another article. In short, just like 12 years ago, Russia probably has the same aim and wants to restore its sphere of influence. Nothing crazy here. Most people will probably acknowledge that Russia wants to maintain its influence and prevent countries on its border from joining NATO.

Now, if you’re on the Western side of the fence, you probably picked the side that wants to grow the influence of your side, so you view NATO expansion as democracy at work. After all, NATO is not invading anyone here, am I right? However, if this were the Warsaw Pact expanding westward, the roles would flip, and many of the same people who support NATO expansion would oppose Warsaw Pact expansion.

See where I’m going with this? Everyone is picking sides instead of analyzing the situation to find a solution that will work.

Russia’s aim is the same as it was before.

Let’s take it for what it is.

Current State

Now, is Russia achieving its aim right now? Let’s take a look:

• NATO gained two new members on Russia’s border, turning the Baltic Sea into the “Lake of NATO,” or whatever the internet calls it these days.

• Offensives are excruciatingly slow.

• Western aid to Ukraine—aside from air defence missiles—has not really slowed down.

• Ukraine is coming up with new technologies, methods, and innovative solutions to complex problems on the battlefield. Russia is too; it goes both ways. But from Russia’s perspective, the longer this goes on, the less likely it is that Russia can simply break Ukraine.

So if the aim stayed the same, but banging your head against the wall in Eastern Ukraine is not working, what do you do?

The right answer is: look for options.

Russia’s Options

• Attack Ukraine from another side. The problem is that Ukraine probably expects that possibility and might be prepared.

Read more

Machiavelli warned in The Prince about mercenaries:

"Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe...

The fact is, they have no other attraction or reason for keeping the field than a trifle of stipend, which is not sufficient to make them willing to die for you.

❗They are ready enough to be your soldiers whilst you do not make war, but if war comes they take themselves off or run from the foe;"

The "stipend" in this case is a pathway to PR status. That is what will drive the decision to join the CAF — not allegiance, nor the desire to serve this country.

I know quite a few people who are desperately looking for legal ways to stay in Canada, so this might be attractive. However, what happens when their status is secured and/or there is an actual conflict the CAF is involved in? Will those who joined for economic/immigration reasons stay when the possibility of serious bodily harm or death becomes likely?

The 2025 report of the Auditor General of Canada, titled "Recruiting for Canada's Military," had a nice graphic (see report link and image below) illustrating the fact that our recruiting problem is not caused by lack of interest from Canadians. Our problem is bureaucracy.

⏳ Personal example: it took me two years to join the CAF.

In that amount of time:
- My application was lost.
- My recruiter changed.
- Some documents I sent were lost, and I was blamed for not submitting them, so I had to forward emails to prove otherwise, including confirmations that they were received.
- My fitness test and medical expired, so I had to redo them.
- I moved to a different city.

🤔 Why would people not walk away and do something else with their life?

If we already have tens of thousands of motivated citizens stuck in administrative limbo, shouldn’t we fix that system before creating new immigration pipelines?

2025 AG Report: https://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_202510_07_e_44723.html

He calls for dramatic tax reform — potentially modeled after Ireland — to restore capital investment, job creation, and long-term competitiveness.

Great article. It raises something Canadians should not ignore.

One point I might add — our governments at all levels need to improve the machinery of government and the public service.

My Experience in Office of the Premier of Ontario

I spent 4 years in the Doug Ford government in Ontario (2019-2023) and saw firsthand how overly bureaucratic our governments are.

The first few years, our mandate was to cut red tape, find value for money, optimize operations, make consumer-facing government services "Simpler, Faster, Better", focusing on deregulating the private sector.

Fast forward to 2021 and the people who came from the private sector on a clear mandate to fix the government saw that there is a dwindling interest in actually doing things that matter. They began fleeing back to the private sector where innovation and efficiency actually matter.

This truly reminded me of the famous question:

"Who is John Galt?"

Soon enough, you had people with no real-world experience running the show — career political staffers and bureaucrats, the people who never generated a single dollar in the private sector.

There are great examples worldwide of governments that run a tight ship that gets out of the way of economic growth, but Canada is not one of them.

Canada needs a small, digital-first, integrated, and agile public service and machinery of government, coupled with simple and fast consumer-facing services to stay competitive by making it easy for businesses and individuals to choose Canada.

Today marks the 4-year anniversary of Zelensky’s address to Ukrainians in which he dismissed Western intelligence that had been warning for months about an impending full-scale Russian invasion.

He urged people to calm down, said nothing would happen, and encouraged preparations for Victory Day — as well as May BBQs, when Ukrainians traditionally celebrate the coming of summer with a week of statutory holidays.

A while before that, in Zelensky’s "Servant of the People" TV series — where he played a simple school teacher from a small village who grew tired of corruption, ran for president, and got elected to fix the country — there was a scene that now feels unsettlingly literal.

This excerpt from "Servant of the People" shows President Holoborodko (literally translated as “Baldbeard”), played by Zelensky, coming home to find his father making a fire.

The original is in Russian. At the time, Zelensky publicly argued that language was irrelevant to state-building — a belief that shaped both his cultural messaging and early political posture.

Zelensky's character: "Hi Dad. You literally read my mind. I've been dreaming of having a BBQ the entire week."

Father: "Don't get your hopes up. This is a ritual fire."

Zelensky's character: "What do you mean?"

Father: "We're going to burn you, dummy. For turning us into primitive people. Now we cook over a fire, wash in the river, and live like we're in a cave. No water, no gas, no electricity."

As regular Ukrainians are braving -20°C winter temperatures with barely any heating, electricity, and often no running water, a Ukrainian regional government administration has just “donated” over $1M USD in taxpayers’ money to a charity fund run by Zelensky’s friend and fellow actor, Serhiy Prytula.

Charities typically fill gaps temporarily. There should not be a regular reliance on them. This prompted me to write this post — there are simply too many unanswered questions around this move.

Why couldn’t the government use the money directly to buy what was needed?

How was this decision made?

How did they choose which charity would receive the funds?

⚠️ See the first comment for Serhiy Prytula’s shocking, passive-aggressive reaction to someone asking whether he keeps 20% of the money…

The question about the charity keeping 20% is reasonable - most charities do keep some of the funds to cover admin and fundraising fees. What is shocking is the passive-aggressive reaction of a prominent public figure linked to the current Ukrainian government.

Here's what he said:

"Does the government provide you with social assistance because of your diagnosis? I can clearly see you need it!"

We just went from "Carney says China is a foreign interference, geopolitical threat for Canada" to "Canada PM hails strategic partnership with China" in less than a year.

In 2024, the Department of National Defence released "Our North, Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for Canada’s Defence" - the guiding defence policy document for the foreseeable future. In it, you can find the following with regard to China, to name a few:

"...an increasingly assertive China challenges the international order..."

"...China’s attempts to reshape the international order to achieve its political goals."

"...growing number of Chinese dual-purpose research vessels and surveillance platforms collecting data about the Canadian North..."

In April, 2025, PM Carney said that "China is a foreign interference, geopolitical threat for Canada."

In November, 2025, CSIS Director, Dan Rogers, said that "Chinese spies have tried to recruit Canadians who have access to government plans, information and military expertise through social media and online job platforms."

How will this impact our relationship with the United States? Will this further widen the already growing rift between Alberta and Ottawa? What about National Security?

So many questions raised by this... 'pivot'.

Thoughts?

The Right Honourable Marc Carney, Prime Minister of Canada, recently said:

“What the government is doing with the gun registry is putting in place a much more efficient way for Canadians to voluntarily return prohibited firearms for fair compensation.”

He is referring to firearms the Government of Canada prohibited through Orders in Council over the past several years. Canadians affected are now presented with three options: destroy their property, hand it over, or face jail time.

Voluntary

Merriam-Webster — “done or given because one wants to and not because one is forced.”

Jail

According to the Government of Canada’s Charterpedia on Section 7 of the Charter, liberty includes protection against physical restraint. Imprisonment or the threat of imprisonment engages the liberty interest. (Government of Canada. Section 7 – Life, liberty, and security of the person)

Gaslighting

Merriam-Webster — “psychological manipulation that causes a person to question the validity of their own thoughts, perception of reality, or memories.”

In the 1930s, Soviet authorities under Joseph Stalin described collectivization in Ukraine as voluntary. In practice, people — including members of my family — were given three options: surrender their farms and livestock, be exiled to Siberia, or face execution. That deception produced the Holodomor, the man-made famine of 1932–33 that killed up to 10 million Ukrainians.

Afterwards, Moscow brought in migrants to replace the Ukrainians who had perished. These newcomers had no ties to the land or loyalty to the local culture. That demographic engineering sowed turmoil and helped set the stage for the war that began in 2014 with the loss of Crimea and parts of the Donbas, and ultimately the full-scale invasion in 2022.

During COVID-19, vaccination was described as a matter of personal choice. For many Canadians, however, refusal resulted in loss of employment or restrictions on access to parts of public life.

In Ukraine, the war made survival the priority. Mandates and restrictions became irrelevant, and many people simply worked around them.

When critics dismiss Alberta as “too small” to thrive independently, they miss the point. Alberta is larger in landmass, comparable in population, and far richer in natural resources than many nations that are outperforming Canada. The real question isn’t whether Alberta could stand on its own, but why Canada, with so much wealth and talent, is falling behind.

Canada is at a crossroads. We’re slipping economically compared to our neighbour, and we’ve failed to read the spirit of the times — the zeitgeist, so to speak. Across the world, globalism, mass immigration, forced multiculturalism, and gender dogma are being rejected. Meanwhile, here at home, unemployment is rising, quality of life is falling, and too many families are struggling just to get by.

✊ Make Canada Progressive Again.

Today that means focusing on the basics of survival: family, economy, culture, and our people. Gender dogma, globalist illusions, and performative multiculturalism are distractions, not solutions.

As we see in Ukraine, when survival is on the line, there is no room for ideological games. If Canada doesn’t toughen up and refocus on survival, stability, and prosperity, it risks losing the very cohesion that keeps it together.

Alberta is a reminder: our provinces have the resources and resilience to succeed, but they shouldn’t have to go it alone.

The whole country needs to rise to the challenge. Now.

He cites her record at Trans Mountain and TransAlta, issues around transparency, project costs, and her connections to Brookfield as reasons for doubt about the appointment and the broader direction of federal governance.

What worries me more is not a background check issue, but the approach Ottawa is taking... Adding bureaucracy is never the answer.

I looked into pledged industrial investment during the first 6 months of Trump’s and Carney’s terms. Full disclosure: I used AI to pull the data, then cross-checked the sources to confirm accuracy. These figures are from official corporate announcements — not government talking points.

🇺🇸

United States (Trump):
• Corporate/project pledges total ≈ US$2.8 trillion.
• Major projects: Apple $600B, NVIDIA $500B, Project Stargate $500B, Micron $200B, IBM $150B, TSMC $100B, J&J $55B, Eli Lilly $27B, Hyundai $21B+, Amazon $34B, and many more.

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Canada (Carney):
• Corporate/project pledges total ≈ C$45B (~US$33B).
• Major projects: LNG Canada Phase 2 (~C$33B), Blackstone floating LNG (~C$10B), Port of Montréal Contrecœur (~C$1.6B), Foran Mining (~C$350M), GE-Hitachi SMR centre (~C$70M).

Per capita comparison:

• U.S. pledged ≈ US$8,100 per resident (US$2.8T / 342M people).
• Canada pledged ≈ US$790 per resident (US$33B / 42M people).

Instead of focusing on enabling business and projects at scale, Canada is adding new bureaucracy (Build Canada Homes agency, Major Projects Office).

I've seen it firsthand how a government handles money and it's not pretty. Budget 'administration' often swells toward 60% of the total budget. Imagine if only 40% of Canada’s $41B defence budget actually reached defence — that’s the scale of the problem. We cannot afford to add agencies, red tape, and more bureaucrats!

I consult businesses, improve processes, and optimize operations to increase productivity for a living. When I look at a process, or one of its steps, one of my first questions is always:

“Do we need this?”

Ottawa today seems more interested in adding people, bloating processes, and creating agencies than identifying and solving the root cause of the problem.

If you’re not bringing back 10% of what you’ve deleted — you're clearly not deleting enough. — Elon Musk

Revisionism is everywhere. People argue, tensions rise, nothing changes.

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Take the French politician demanding the Statue of Liberty back. You don’t take back gifts. Move forward. The obsession with the past is why we are where we are today.

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The same thinking applies to Canada. Canada acts betrayed when the U.S. applies pressure—trade war, tariffs, shifting alliances. The U.S. isn’t obligated to put Canada first. Control what you can. Build resilience. Diversify. Make the most of what you have without reckless rhetoric. A strong Canada benefits us, the U.S. and our shared continent.

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Look at Ukraine. Since 1991, corruption, poor governance, misplaced trust, and bad decisions have led to where it is now. The Budapest Memorandum was a failure. Does it matter now? No. Ukrainian officials read it and signed it, with the Ukrainian text saying “guarantees” instead of “assurances”—two very different words.

The only commitment was a promise to consult. Go read it. Did 'consultations' help? No. Is the U.S. bound to do more? No. Ukraine traded power (nukes) for words (memorandum). The past is done. Could Ukraine have deterred Russia? Yes. Devise a new strategy and focus on own military. Modernize. Eliminate corruption. Uphold rule of law. Did it do enough? No.

⚔️ Russia attacked Ukraine at least 12 times in the last 400 years. This is not new. Ukraine could have done more between 1991-2014 and 2014-2022. By the way, elections were held in 2019, during wartime. Zelensky won in 2019 and had 3 years to prepare for 2022. Did Ukraine do enough? No. Can it change the past? No. But better decisions can still be made today.

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The U.S. has no obligation to help others. If Ukraine can take on Russia alone, it should. If Canada can replace U.S. trade, it should. Was over-reliance on someone else a bad decision in both cases? Maybe. Do you expect strangers to help you if you make bad decisions? Probably not. Same here.

Ukraine should focus on what it controls instead of telling others what will happen to them if they don’t help. Likewise, Canada should focus on what's under our control — military, economy, global trade, instead of trading verbal punches.

History offers lessons, not solutions. What matters is what you do now. Play the cards you have, because wishing they were different won’t change a thing.